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a b s t r a c t
This paper assesses the performances of professional GDP growth and inflation forecasts for
ten Asian economies for the period 1995–2012. We evaluate the accuracy of the forecasts,
and test for unbiasedness and efficiency. Our results show that (i) forecast errors are large
for most of the countries, but there are big differences between countries; (ii) forecasts im-
prove slowly as the forecast horizon shortens, which helps to explain themagnitudes of the
forecast errors; (iii) GDP growth forecasts underreact to economic news but inflation fore-
casts are mostly efficient; (iv) the sizes of forecast biases vary widely between countries,
with a tendency for inflation to be overestimated; and (v) forecasts have value in predicting
the direction of change.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of International Institute of
Forecasters.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).rn1. Introduction
There has been intensive study of the performances
of professional macroeconomic forecasts. Using various
data sets and methodologies, the empirical literature has
analyzed the issues of forecast accuracy, unbiasedness and
efficiency extensively, and shed light on the way in which
forecasters form their expectations. One limitation of the
literature is that it has focused mainly on large advanced
countries, such as the US and other G-7 countries (see,
e.g., Ager, Kappler, & Osterloh, 2009; Clements & Taylor,
2001; Dovern & Weisser, 2011; Isiklar, Lahiri, & Loungani,
2006). Only recently have some studies paid specific
attention to emerging countries (e.g., Krkoska & Teksoz,
2009, for transition countries; Carvalho & Minella, 2012,
for Brazil; and Capistrán & López-Moctezuma, 2014, for
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of professional macroeconomic forecasts in Asia, with the
notable exception of a small number of studies that have
focused on individual countries (see Ashiya, 2005, for
Japan; Lahiri & Isiklar, 2009, for India; and Deschamps &
Bianchi, 2012, for China).1
In this paper, we use the Asian-Pacific Consensus Fore-
casts to provide the first comprehensive evaluation of
the macroeconomic forecasts produced for ten Asian
economies, namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
We assess the accuracy, unbiasedness and efficiency of
forecasts of GDP growth and inflation, two key variables
for macroeconomic analysis (see Costantini & Kunst, 2011;
Golinelli & Parigi, 2008, 2014).
Several studies have found differences in forecast per-
formances between advanced and emerging economies,
1 Ashiya (2005) and Lahiri and Isiklar (2009) use different techniques
from those used in this paper, and Deschamps and Bianchi (2012) do not
assess the directional forecast accuracy.
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the efficient use of information (Dovern, Fritsche, Loun-
gani, & Tamirisa, 2015; Loungani, 2001; Loungani, Stek-
ler, & Tamirisa, 2013). After several decades of fast growth,
some Asian economies have recently acquired the status
of advanced economies, while some others, though still
emerging, are growing rapidly. In this respect, it is worth
investigating the performances of forecasts in these newly-
advanced economies and comparing them with those ob-
served in previous studies for advanced and emerging
countries. In addition, it is also important to examine
whether any progress has been made in improving fore-
cast performances over the years, since the economies of
many countries have transitioned from low/middle income
to middle/high income.
Another important point with Asian economies is that
they have all experienced large economic fluctuations:
while recessions have tended to be more severe and
longer-lasting than those in developed countries (Hong,
Lee, & Tang, 2010), sharp economic recoveries have also
occurred. Furthermore, Asia hasmade remarkable progress
in fighting against inflation (Filardo & Genberg, 2010), and
it is of interest to examine the performances of forecasters
in such a volatile and fast-changing environment.
We analyze professional Asian macroeconomic fore-
casts over the period 1995–2012. The data set includes
a large number of forecasters, and fixed-event forecasts
are reported for horizons of up to 24 months. To eval-
uate the accuracy of the professional forecasts, we use
the RMSE and a recent directional measure proposed by
Blaskowitz and Herwartz (2009). While accuracy, as mea-
sured by quantitative errors, is important, predicting the
direction of change of crucial variables correctly may also
be important. This is the case for GDP growth and infla-
tion, which are the most important macroeconomic goals
for policy makers (a central bank can raise/lower the in-
terest rate if inflation rises/falls, to stabilize the economy).
To test for forecast unbiasedness and efficiency, we use
the econometric approach that was initially developed by
Davies and Lahiri (1995), and later extended by Clements,
Joutz, and Stekler (2007), Ager et al. (2009) andDovern and
Weisser (2011). We choose to analyze individual forecasts
rather than consensus forecasts in order to shed light on
the individual heterogeneity across forecasters and avoid
any problem of aggregation bias.
It should be noted that Loungani (2001), Loungani et al.
(2013) andDovern et al. (2015) use a larger data set that in-
cludes ours. However, our paper differs from theirs in sev-
eral respects. First, they do not analyze inflation forecasts.
Second, we focus on individual countries, whereas they
pool across all countries (Asian and non-Asian).2 Third, we
analyze individual forecasts, whereas Loungani (2001) and
Loungani et al. (2013) study consensus forecasts. Finally,
we also address various other issues, such as directional
accuracy, long-term predictability, and the acquisition of
information.
2 Using a different methodology, Dovern et al. (2015) only report
results for individual countries in the case of efficiency.Our analysis shows large forecast errors for both GDP
growth and inflation series in most cases, with consider-
able differences in terms of accuracy both across coun-
tries (especially for inflation) and across forecasters. We
find that the forecasts improve very slowly from long to
short horizons, which may help to explain the large mag-
nitude of the forecast errors. However, there is no evidence
that the forecasts have improved over the years. On the
other hand, we find that the forecasts are rather accurate
in terms of directional changes. The findings also show that
the GDP growth forecasts are unbiased for about half of
the countries. For the inflation series, we often find a ten-
dency to overpredict. Asia has experienced a decline in in-
flation over the past two decades, and the forecasters have
failed to adjust fully to this trend of slowing inflation, caus-
ing an overprediction bias. As for the efficiency of the fore-
casts, evidence of a moderate underreaction is found for
GDP growth, but not for inflation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the data. In Section 3, we assess the accuracy of the
forecasts, and in particular the RMSE. In Section 4 we test
for forecast unbiasedness, and in Section 5 we test for
forecast efficiency. Section 6 investigates the sources of
forecast accuracy disparities in Asia. Section 7 evaluates
the directional forecast accuracy, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Data
In this study we use the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
data set, provided by Consensus Economics, which consists
of monthly predictions made by a panel of professional
forecasting institutions. We consider GDP growth and in-
flation forecasts for ten Asian economies, namely China,
India, Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia,
Japan, Thailand, and Singapore. The forecast institutions
surveyed are typically large and reputable financial in-
stitutions (e.g., commercial banks, investment banks, and
insurance companies), industrial corporations, consulting
firms, and research institutes. The sample includes both
non-Asian forecasters (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley) and local ones (e.g., Hyundai for Korea, Mizuho for
Japan and Tata for India).
The structure of the data is as follows. Every month,
each panelist forecasts GDP growth and inflation (i.e., the
consumer price index inflation) for both the current year
and the next year. Thus, each forecaster releases up to 24
forecasts for each target year. For instance, the first set of
forecasts for the year 2012 is made in January 2011, and
the final set is made in December 2012. Thus, the data
set has a three-dimension panel structure, with 18 target
years t (t = 1, . . . , T , with T = 18), 24 forecast hori-
zons h (h = 1, . . . ,H , with H = 24), and N forecast-
ers i (i = 1, . . . ,N , where N varies across countries). The
horizon h denotes the number of months ahead that the
forecast is made. For instance, when a forecast is made in
February 2012 for the target year 2012, the horizon is 11
months, i.e., h = 11. Therefore, horizons h = 1 to h = 12
correspond to current-year forecasts, and h = 13 to h = 24
correspond to forecasts for the following year, i.e., the fore-
casts made 13 to 24 months ahead. Our sample includes
156 Q. Chen et al. / International Journal of Forecasting 32 (2016) 154–167Fig. 1. Actual values (solid line) and consensus forecast at h = 12 (dashed line) for GDP growth and inflation.forecasts made for the target years 1995–2012.3 It follows
that, for each forecaster, the maximum number of releases
for each series is 420 (that is, 17× 24+ 12).
One important aspect of this data set is that it is heav-
ily unbalanced, as the set of forecasters participating in
the survey changes over time. In addition, there are also
gaps among the participating panelists, because they sub-
mit new forecasts at irregular dates, and do not always re-
port current forecasts when they have no new forecasts.
We discard forecasters with fewer than 100 observations,
leaving a total of more than 51,000 observations and 175
forecasters for each variable. In our final sample, the num-
ber of forecasters ranges from a minimum of 13 for India
and Indonesia to amaximum of 23 for Japan, and the num-
ber of observations ranges from a minimum of 3,354 for
India to a maximum of 6,248 for Japan. Considering the se-
lected forecasters, the number of observations corresponds
to 62% of the fully balanced panel for Thailand (minimum)
and 79% for Indonesia (maximum). It should be noted that
more observations are available for short horizons than for
long horizons, with the number of observations at h = 1
being approximately double that for h = 24.
Another aspect of the data set is that a given forecaster
may be represented by several different versions of their
3 Note that only horizons h = 1 to h = 12 are available for the
target year 1995, but all 24 horizons are available for the remaining years,
1996–2012.name. For instance, the labels Citigroup and SSB Citibank
refer to the same forecast institution. It is therefore
essential to clean the data carefully and allocate the same
unique forecaster ID to different labels when it is clear that
they correspond to the same forecaster. For the realized
values of GDP growth and inflation, we use the first
IMF estimates, which are typically included in the April
release of the World Economic Outlook of the following
year.4 In the Appendix, we discuss the robustness of our
results using the latest available estimates of actual figures
rather than the first estimates. Following the conventional
notation, we denote the forecast made by panelist i for the
target year t at forecast horizon h by fi,t,h. The actual value
of the variable of interest for year t is denoted by At , and
ei,t,h = At − fi,t,h represents the forecast error.
Fig. 1 shows the actual values of GDP growth and infla-
tion, as well as the 12-month-ahead consensus forecasts
(the mean of the individual forecasts). Consensus forecasts
are noticeably more stable than the actual values, as large
fluctuations in growth and inflation are usually recognized
late in the year, passing from the January survey (h = 12)
to that of December (h = 1) of the year to be forecast. For
instance, the 12-month-ahead growth forecasts for Hong
Kong failed to predict the recessions of 1998 and 2009, and
4 It should be noted that the forecasts for India aremade for fiscal years
rather than calendar years, and we use the World Bank estimates for the
actual values.
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Root mean squared errors averaged across forecasters.
China Japan Taiwan Hong Kong Korea Singapore India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
GDP
h = 1 0.36 0.44 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.80 0.59 0.42 0.89
h = 4 0.57 0.88 1.07 1.12 0.85 1.39 0.97 1.14 0.82 1.61
h = 8 0.90 1.38 2.09 2.48 1.97 2.83 1.41 1.54 2.13 3.08
h = 12 1.13 1.85 2.41 3.09 2.39 3.55 1.75 2.68 3.23 3.60
h = 16 1.42 2.56 3.16 4.52 4.37 4.45 1.70 4.68 4.75 4.91
h = 20 1.59 2.66 3.21 4.31 4.14 4.63 1.75 5.16 5.15 5.52
h = 24 1.71 2.50 3.03 3.90 3.93 4.22 1.93 3.84 3.69 4.71
Inflation
h = 1 0.36 0.11 0.30 0.32 0.17 0.19 0.88 0.70 0.24 0.33
h = 4 0.97 0.21 0.39 0.63 0.33 0.36 1.01 3.25 0.50 0.77
h = 8 2.06 0.37 0.78 1.24 0.92 0.84 1.84 2.61 1.14 1.10
h = 12 2.59 0.50 1.10 1.82 1.15 1.52 2.58 8.63 1.18 1.25
h = 16 4.19 0.72 1.51 2.70 1.54 1.77 2.57 12.69 1.80 2.27
h = 20 4.82 0.68 1.64 3.25 1.76 1.74 2.60 13.12 1.67 2.51
h = 24 4.93 0.71 1.64 3.44 1.62 1.80 2.79 10.26 1.69 2.26
Notes: h is the forecast horizon.also failed to predict the strong growth of 2000 and 2004.
Forecasters also have a limited ability to predict extreme
events, such as the Indonesia hyperinflation of 1998 (60.7%
inflation), at h = 12.
With regard to the actual values, there are large dif-
ferences in the unconditional variability between coun-
tries. Inflation is considerably more stable in Japan
(standard deviation of 0.75) than in Indonesia (12.98). Like-
wise, GDP growth is much more stable in China (1.24) and
India (1.70) than in small open economies such as Hong
Kong (3.84) and Singapore (4.42), or in South East Asia
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand). Apart from a few excep-
tions, such as inflation in Japan and GDP growth in China
and India, GDP growth and inflation are noticeably more
volatile in Asia than in the United States and other large
non-Asian advanced economies. In Asia, recessions tend to
be deeper and recoveries sharper, resulting in large fluc-
tuations in economic activity and inflation. For instance,
the GDP growth in Singapore jumped from−2% in 2009 to
14.7% in 2010, and the inflation in China fell from 17.1% to
8.4% between 1995 and 1996.
3. Forecast errors
In this section, we first report the root mean squared
forecast error (RMSE) and the long-term predictability of
each series. We then examine the evolution of the RMSE
over forecast horizons and target years, and highlight some
important facts.
3.1. RMSE and predictability
We assess the forecast accuracy using the root mean
squared error. We define the RMSE for forecaster i at
horizon h as RMSEi,h =

T−1
T
t=1 e
2
i,t,h, and the aver-
age of the individual RMSEs at horizon h as RMSEh =
1
N
N
i=1 RMSEi,h. In Table 1, we report the RMSEh for se-
lected forecast horizons. Similarly to previous studies (see
e.g. Lahiri & Sheng, 2010), we find that the forecast er-
rors are mostly flat for approximately the first 10 months
(i.e., h > 14). At long horizons, there are virtually no infor-
mation gains, as the economic shocks tend to be absorbedfully during the current year, with no potential impact on
the growth and inflation in the next year. After approxi-
mately the first 10 months (i.e., h < 14), the forecasts
become increasingly accurate as the horizon shortens, and
information about the actual value accumulates.
The forecast errors vary considerably across countries,
especially at long and middle horizons. For instance, when
GDP growth forecasts are considered, the RMSE12 (i.e., the
RMSE for January of the year to be forecast) is much higher
in Singapore (3.55) and Malaysia (3.23) than in China
(1.13) and India (1.70). The disparities are even wider for
inflation; for example, the RMSE12 is equal to 8.63 for
Indonesia and 0.50 for Japan. In most cases, these figures
aremuchhigher than those reported in previous studies for
developed non-Asian economies using the same data set
(see e.g. Dovern & Weisser, 2011), indicating that growth
and inflation are inherently difficult to forecast for most
Asian countries. A few exceptions are the forecasts of the
output growth in China and India, and of inflation in Japan.
On average, the forecasts for the advanced economies
(Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea) are no
more accurate than those for the emerging economies
(China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand). It should
be noted that these findings are not driven by outliers
(i.e., forecasters with extremely high RMSEs); for instance,
using themedian of individual RMSEs rather than themean
would provide almost exactly the same results.
Table 1 also shows that the RMSEs for inflation are
lower than those for the GDP growth for most of the coun-
tries. This result, which has been reported previously for
developed economies (e.g., Harvey, Leybourne, & New-
bold, 2001), underscores the fact that the actual inflation is
easier to predict. One possible reason for this may be that
inflation is more stable than GDP growth. However, the re-
verse is observed in China, India and Indonesia. The output
has traditionally been relatively simple to forecast in China,
due to government control over the economic activity and
its ability to meet growth targets. In India and Indonesia,
there have been rather large inflation shocks (with infla-
tion sometimes exceeding 10%), and inflation is more dif-
ficult to predict than stable growth.
A comparison of absolute RMSEs shows that GDP
growth and inflation are more difficult to forecast in
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misleading to associate low RMSEs with high forecast-
ing abilities, and some series can be intrinsically easier to
predict than others for many different reasons. Therefore,
we use the statistics by Diebold and Kilian (2001) to com-
pare predictability performances (see also Lahiri & Sheng,
2010). More specifically, we define ph,24 as the proportion-
ate gain in mean squared error (MSE) between the hori-
zon 24 forecasts and the horizon h forecasts, such that
ph,24 = 1 − (MSEh/MSE24).5The ph,24 statistics shows the
improvement in the forecast accuracy at horizon h com-
pared to the naïve forecast of horizon 24. The predictability
naturally increases aswemove from long to short horizons,
and typically approaches 95%–100% at short horizons.
Fig. 2 shows that the predictability is higher for inflation
than for growth for most of the countries and horizons,
which confirms the impression that inflation is easier to
predict. We find that the predictability remains at zero
until late in the forecasting cycle for many countries,
and for GDP growth in particular. For instance, for the
GDP growth of Malaysia, ph,24 only becomes positive after
horizon 13 (i.e., December of the previous year), indicating
that the first 12 months bring no useful information over
and above the ‘‘naïve’’ forecast of horizon 24.
In general, we find considerable differences between
countries. For instance, the predictability of GDP growth
ranges from 0.18 for India (minimum) to 0.63 for Korea
(maximum) when h = 12. For inflation, the predictability
5 Note that we report the maximum between 0 and ph,24 . In
practice, negative values for ph,24 can occur when forecasters receive no
meaningful information at the very long horizons andMSEh > MSE24 .ranges from0.29 for Singapore to 0.72 for Hong Kongwhen
h = 12. On average, countries with a good predictability
for GDP growth also tend to have a good predictability for
inflation (the cross-country correlation is between 0.3 and
0.5 for most horizons). In general, China shows the best
predictability of the various countries for both growth and
inflation, whereas India has the lowest predictability for
both series.
Finally, it should be noticed that the RMSE is correlated
strongly with the unconditional variance of the actual val-
ues. Pooling across the forecasters, the correlation ranges
from 0.9 to 1 for inflation, depending on the horizon, and
from 0.7 to 1 for GDP growth. In contrast, the ranking of
countries based on the Diebold–Kilian statistics is corre-
lated only weakly with the ranking of countries based on
the RMSE. Therefore, the high variability of growth and
inflation in Asia may help explain the poor RMSE perfor-
mance. The RMSEs of volatile series are particularly large
at long horizons, when forecasters possess little economic
information.
3.2. Distribution of forecast errors
Due to the unbalanced nature of our panel, it may not
be particularly meaningful to compare RMSEs across indi-
vidual forecasters directly. Indeed, panelists that have been
active during time periods that are easy to forecast will
obviously perform better. In order to take this issue into
account, we follow Clements (2014) and use an adjusted
RMSEmeasure, where the actual squared forecast errors of
year t are weighted by the cross-sectional average for year
t relative to the average over all years (see Clements, 2014).
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Distribution of adjusted-RMSE values across forecasters.
China Japan Taiwan Hong Kong Korea Singapore India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
h = 6
GDP mean 0.76 0.92 1.55 1.72 1.16 2.08 1.10 0.83 1.23 1.73
std 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.17
min 1.00 1.05 2.09 2.14 1.55 2.46 1.20 1.12 1.43 2.07
max 0.60 0.76 1.21 1.39 0.96 1.69 0.99 0.48 0.99 1.49
Inflation mean 1.06 0.29 0.59 0.68 0.48 0.52 1.30 1.66 0.62 0.81
std 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.31 0.75 0.16 0.17
min 1.30 0.45 0.74 1.23 0.78 0.74 1.73 3.54 0.87 1.08
max 0.79 0.16 0.34 0.46 0.27 0.38 0.88 0.99 0.41 0.59
corr. 0.46* 0.39 0.10 −0.28 0.47* −0.59** −0.39 0.10 −0.12 −0.08
h = 12
GDP mean 1.12 1.62 2.00 2.51 1.79 3.08 1.65 1.59 2.41 2.69
std 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.29
min 1.34 1.81 2.35 3.00 2.28 3.58 1.84 1.96 2.76 3.00
max 0.98 1.35 1.54 1.86 1.39 2.30 1.49 1.20 2.04 2.21
Inflation mean 2.03 0.46 0.98 1.48 1.01 1.16 2.31 4.54 1.34 1.24
std 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.34 0.96 0.52 0.16
min 2.56 0.65 1.17 1.78 1.30 1.41 2.76 6.39 2.73 1.48
max 1.63 0.28 0.86 1.25 0.71 0.97 1.53 2.90 0.87 1.03
corr. −0.06 0.33 0.31 −0.22 0.58** 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.37
Notes: The table reports the distribution of adjusted-RMSE values across individual forecasters for horizons of 6 and 12, calculated as in Eqs. (1) and (2).
Corr. indicates the cross-sectional correlation between the adjusted-RMSEs.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.More specifically, the adjusted RMSE is calculated as
RMSEadji,h =
T−1 T
t=1
e∗2i,t,h , (1)
with
e∗2i,t,h = e2i,t,h ×
mediant(mediani(|ei,t,h|))
mediani(|ei,t,h|) , (2)
where mediani is the cross-sectional median and mediant
is the median over all t . Therefore, if the forecast errors are
large at horizon h and year t compared with the forecast
errors for the same horizon but other t , then the weight
mediant (mediani(|ei,t,h|))
mediani(|ei,t,h|) < 1 and the squared errors will be re-
duced. Note that we use the median rather than the mean
in order to lessen the influence of outliers.
In Table 2, we show the cross-sectional distribution
of the adjusted-RMSE across forecasters for two selected
horizons, h = 6 and h = 12. We consider forecasters
with at least 10 observations. In some cases, we find a large
dispersion in accuracy. For instance, when considering the
Korea GDP growth forecasts at h = 12, we find that
the maximum and minimum adjusted-RMSEs are 2.28
and 1.39 (ratio of 1.64), respectively. In most cases, the
adjusted-RMSE of the least accurate forecaster is about
twice as large as themost accurate one,whichmay indicate
differences in forecasting ability. For most of the countries,
the dispersion is slightly larger for inflation than for GDP
growth, and the largest cases of dispersion are all related
to inflation forecasts.
Table 2 also shows the correlation between the
adjusted-RMSEs of GDP growth and inflation. Some of the
correlation coefficients are positive and some are negative,
which leads us to conclude that there is no strong evidence
that panelistswith superiorGDPgrowth forecasts also tend
to produce more accurate inflation forecasts.3.3. Forecast errors over the horizons
We indicate above that forecasts fail to improve
substantially over approximately the first 10 months.
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of information arrival across
horizons. We calculate the change in RMSEs between two
consecutive horizons as ∆RMSEh = RMSEh+1 − RMSEh,
and scale it by RMSE24. A positive value for
∆RMSEh
RMSE24
implies
information gains between h+1 and h, whereas a negative
value indicates that the forecasts have become less
accurate. Rather than reporting the results for individual
countries, we report the cross-country average in order get
an indication of the timing of economic news in Asia.
We fit a non-parametric curve and find an inverted-
L shaped relationship for both the GDP growth and
inflation forecasts. The information gains are initially
nonexistent but gradually increase, peaking atmiddle hori-
zons as the economic news becomes increasingly infor-
mative. At short horizons, the information gains remain
remarkably high, especially for GDP growth but also for in-
flation to lesser extent. These results contrast with those
of Isiklar and Lahiri (2007), who find an inverted U-shape
for advanced economies, and imply that the forecasts in
Asia improve relatively slowly. The large forecast errors
found in Asia may also be due to this. One possible ex-
planation for this difference is the fact that the economic
indicators in many Asian countries, including China and
India (see Dovern et al., 2015; Nilsson & Brunet, 2006),
are often not as informative of growth as is the case for
countries such as the United States. Fewer quality indica-
tors are available, which is expected to delay the acquisi-
tion of information. As a consequence, it may take longer
for forecasters to form accurate expectations about GDP
growth. Thailand and Taiwan are two examples of coun-
tries in which panelists keep on making large forecast re-
visions for GDP growth, even at the later stages of the
160 Q. Chen et al. / International Journal of Forecasting 32 (2016) 154–167Fig. 3. Changes in RMSE between two consecutive horizons, averaged across forecasters.Fig. 4. RMSEs of GDP growth (solid line, left scale) and inflation forecasts for h = 12.forecasting cycle, which leads to substantial accuracy im-
provements at short horizons.
3.4. Forecast errors over the years
We find that the forecast accuracy varies not only across
forecasters, but also over time. In Fig. 4, we report theforecast errors when the horizon h = 12 is considered
(note that the findings would be qualitatively the same
if other horizons were selected). It turns out that the
forecast errors are considerably higher during recession
years than in calm periods. For most of the countries, the
forecast errors increased sharply during the 1998 Asian
crisis, before returning to low levels during the calmperiod
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and 2009, before starting to decline from 2010. China
and India are two exceptions: their forecast errors are
less cyclical, due to a stable economic growth and an
absence of recessions. Interestingly, there is no evidence
that forecasts in Asia have become more accurate over
time. For instance, for most of the countries, the RMSEs
over the period 2010–2012 are no lower than they were
during the 1995–1997 and 2000–2007 periods.
Overall, our analysis indicates that the growing matu-
rity of Asian economies has not been accompanied by an
improved forecast accuracy. However, there are some no-
table exceptions. For instance, Indonesia’s GDP growth and
inflation forecasts have become more accurate over time,
which reflects the country’s long period of economic sta-
bility and lower inflation, beginning in the aftermath of the
1998 recession.
4. Testing forecast unbiasedness
In this section, we test for forecast unbiasedness. To do
this, we use the error decomposition model that was pro-
posed initially by Davies and Lahiri (1995) and extended
later by Clements et al. (2007) and Dovern and Weisser
(2011). The objective of this model is to have an estimator
that accommodates the three-dimensional nature of the
data set and provides standard errors that are consistent
with the data structure. Themodel postulates that the fore-
cast errors ei,t,h, that is, the differences between the actual
values and the forecasts, ei,t,h = At − fi,t,h, can be decom-
posed into three parts:
ei,t,h = φi + λt,h + εi,t,h, (3)
whereφi captures a forecaster-specific bias,λt,h represents
the effects of unanticipated macroeconomic shocks that
occur between the time when the forecast is made and the
end of year t , and εi,t,h is the error term. For the analysis,
it is assumed that λt,h =hk=1 ut,k (the sum of the shocks
affecting the rational expectation value of the target vari-
able), where ut,k has a mean of zero and a variance of σ 2u ,
and εi,t,h =hk=1 ηi,t,k, where ηi,t,k has a zero mean and a
variance of σ 2i (see Deschamps & Ioannidis, 2013). We es-
timate the three components of the error model in Eq. (3)
as follows:
φˆi = 1TH
T
t=1
H
h=1
(At − fi,t,h) (4)
λˆt,h = 1N
N
i=1
(At − fi,t,h − φˆi) (5)
εˆi,t,h = At − fi,t,h − φˆi − λˆt,h. (6)
In order to test unbiasedness for forecaster i, we test
the hypothesis that φi = 0 in Eq. (3); φi > 0 and φi <
0 indicate forecast underestimation and overestimation,
respectively. A simple OLS regression of the forecast errors
on a constant delivers a consistent estimate of the bias φi.
However, due to the error structure assumed in Eq. (3), we
cannot use the OLS standard errors. In order to estimate
standard errors, we therefore use a GMM-type estimator(see also Dovern &Weisser, 2011). This estimator accounts
for the fact that the error terms are correlated across target
years, forecast horizons and forecasters. The standard
errors of the forecaster-specific bias φˆi are estimated using
the covariance matrix (X ′X)−1X ′ΣX(X ′X)−1, where Σ is
the NTH × NTH error covariance matrix that is consistent
with the error decomposition model. To estimate Σ , we
need to compute the non-zero covariances between the
composite error terms, which are given by:
Cov(At1 − fi,t1,h1 , At2 − fj,t2,h2)
= Cov
 h1
k=1
ut1,k +
h1
k=1
ηi,t1,k,
h2
k=1
ut2,k +
h2
k=1
ηj,t2,k

. (7)
To establish whether the forecasts are biased on aver-
age, we also perform a test of unbiasedness by imposing
a common bias φ across forecasters. Due to sample size
limitations, we do not provide any formal test of horizon-
specific biases. Nonetheless, we report the mean forecast
errors for selected horizons in Table 3 to show that they
may vary across horizons.
The table shows that the magnitude of the mean
forecast errors is typically larger at long horizons than
at short horizons. Intuitively, the mean forecast errors
are smaller at short horizons, due to the availability of
superior information. In spite of these differences, it is
worth estimating the overall bias in order to assess the
general tendency toward over-/underpredicting growth
and inflation. Table 4 summarizes the results pooled over
all of the horizons (see Eq. (3)). For growth forecasts, the
hypothesis of unbiasedness can only be rejected for China
(0.33 percentage points), Thailand (−0.83) and Taiwan
(−0.42). In the case of Thailand, the overprediction bias is
explained by the fact that the country was hit by two deep
recessions that the forecasters failed to predict. On the
other hand, the forecasts for China underpredict growth,
indicating that China’s strong growth over the past two
decades was not anticipated. For the remaining countries,
the estimates are not significant.
Turning to individual forecasters, Table 4 shows that
forecast unbiasedness cannot be rejected for most of
the forecasters, in part because the correlation structure
of the forecast errors leads to large standard errors.
Overall, our analysis reveals differences in growth forecast
biases between countries, in terms of both the direction
and magnitude. Nonetheless, the forecast biases are only
statistically significant for a minority of countries and
forecasters.
As for inflation, the forecasts are significantly biased for
five countries, namely China, Taiwan, India, Malaysia and
Hong Kong. The estimates are negative for all countries
except for Indonesia and India, indicating a broad tendency
toward overestimation. Following the 1997–1998 crisis,
Asia experienced a structural decline in inflation, and
the forecasts have been adjusting too slowly, producing
an overprediction bias. China is one example of this
phenomenon. After experiencing an inflation of 17.1% in
1995, China saw a rapid reduction in inflation, which
was largely unanticipated, causing an overprediction bias.
India is an outlier. Its inflation has increased over the past
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Mean forecast errors.
China Japan Taiwan Honk Kong Korea Singapore India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
GDP
h = 1 0.11 −0.06 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.14 −0.11
h = 4 0.19 −0.20 0.02 0.33 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.28 0.20 −0.31
h = 8 0.32 0.09 −0.04 0.19 0.08 0.48 −0.01 0.01 −0.06 −0.66
h = 12 0.44 −0.10 −0.31 −0.01 0.03 0.35 0.04 −0.37 −0.19 −0.99
h = 16 0.30 −0.62 −0.93 −0.35 −0.76 −0.44 −0.21 −1.40 −0.93 −1.75
h = 20 0.36 −0.87 −1.03 −0.73 −0.76 −0.69 −0.38 −1.59 −1.33 −1.97
h = 24 0.41 −0.63 −0.94 −0.46 −0.84 −0.42 −0.31 −1.24 −0.81 −1.86
Inflation
h = 1 −0.05 0.01 −0.02 −0.10 −0.08 −0.00 0.13 0.05 −0.08 −0.10
h = 4 −0.41 −0.00 −0.16 −0.34 −0.14 −0.04 0.08 −0.95 −0.30 −0.29
h = 8 −0.84 −0.00 −0.32 −0.71 −0.26 −0.06 0.27 0.36 −0.41 −0.19
h = 12 −0.90 0.01 −0.44 −1.03 −0.17 −0.02 0.60 2.64 −0.38 0.01
h = 16 −1.68 −0.18 −0.76 −1.58 −0.00 −0.04 0.47 3.73 −0.57 −0.56
h = 20 −1.98 −0.24 −0.86 −1.88 −0.09 −0.10 0.52 4.45 −0.47 −0.25
h = 24 −2.02 −0.26 −0.90 −1.80 −0.06 −0.03 0.71 3.92 −0.64 −0.12Table 4
Unbiasedness test results.
GDP Inflation No. of forecasters
φ φi > 0 φi < 0 φ φi > 0 φi < 0
Japan −0.29
(0.23)
1 5 −0.07
(0.08)
0 2 23
China 0.33
(0.13)
*** 12 0 −1.02
(0.31)
*** 0 10 21
Hong Kong 0.02
(0.31)
1 0 −0.93
(0.24)
*** 0 12 19
Taiwan −0.42
(0.29)
* 0 2 −0.45
(0.14)
*** 0 10 18
Korea −0.30
(0.31)
0 0 −0.06
(0.21)
0 0 17
Singapore −0.08
(0.68)
1 0 0.01
(0.15)
3 0 18
Thailand −0.83
(0.36)
** 0 4 −0.20
(0.25)
0 2 16
Malaysia −0.28
(0.28)
0 2 −0.37
(0.17)
** 0 7 16
India 0.01
(0.17)
1 0 0.59
(0.29)
** 2 1 13
Indonesia −0.49
(0.41)
0 0 1.84
(1.26)
1 0 13
Notes: φ indicates the bias parameter (see Section 4). φi > 0 and φi < 0 (see Eq. (3)) refer to the numbers of forecasters with positive (negative) biases at
the 5% level. No. of forecasters denotes the number of forecasters. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.decade and the forecasters have failed to adjust, causing an
underprediction bias.
We also compute the mean forecast errors for each
month separately for every year, and find that the forecasts
tend to be more heavily biased in months that precede
large macroeconomic shocks.6 As a result, the forecasts
typically underpredict GDP during years of rapid growth
and overpredict during recession years. For instance, fore-
casters were overly optimistic (by about 2–3 percentage
points) for the 2009 GDP forecasts for most of the coun-
tries, as they failed to recognize the severity of the reces-
sion. Likewise, an overprediction bias can also be observed
for the 1998 Asian crisis. A similar pattern is observed for
inflation: the forecasters failed to predict unusual events
such as an inflation of 60% in Indonesia in 1998, resulting
in large forecast biases during those years.
6 The results for this are not reported here, but are available from the
authors upon request.5. Testing forecast efficiency
In this section, we test for weak form efficiency
(see Nordhaus, 1987). The forecasts are efficient when
they incorporate all of the available past information.7
Nordhaus proposes a test that is based on restricting the
set of information to the lagged forecast revisions. If the
forecasts are efficient, future forecast revisions should be
unpredictable. The hypothesis of efficiency implies βi = 0
in the following regression of the forecast revisions on their
lagged value:
ri,t,h = βiri,t,h+1 + ξi,t,h, (8)
where ri,t,h = fi,t,h − fi,t,h+1 denotes the forecast revisions
between horizons h+ 1 and h. When βˆi > 0 in Eq. (8), the
7 The hypothesis of strong form efficiency is of limited practical use,
as it requires a knowledge of the entire information set, which is not
available to most econometricians.
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Efficiency test results.
GDP Inflation No. of forecasters
β βi > 0 βi < 0 β βi > 0 βi < 0
Japan 0.12
(0.03)
*** 9 0 0.04
(0.02)
** 1 1 23
China 0.00
(0.03)
0 0 0.00
(0.04)
0 1 21
Hong Kong 0.08
(0.03)
*** 2 1 0.03
(0.03)
1 0 19
Taiwan 0.16
(0.04)
*** 6 0 0.03
(0.03)
0 0 18
Korea 0.10
(0.03)
*** 6 0 −0.06
(0.03)
** 0 2 17
Singapore 0.14
(0.03)
*** 7 0 0.02
(0.03)
0 0 18
Thailand 0.07
(0.04)
* 2 0 0.06
(0.03)
** 2 0 16
Malaysia 0.08
(0.03)
*** 1 0 −0.02
(0.04)
0 1 16
India 0.05
(0.04)
0 0 −0.01
(0.04)
0 1 13
Indonesia 0.08
(0.04)
* 3 0 0.03
(0.03)
2 0 13
Notes: β denotes the pooled estimates of Eq. (8). For the interpretation of βi > 0 and βi > 0, see Section 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. No. of
forecasters denotes the number of forecasters.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.forecasts tend to be overly smooth. In other words, when
new information arrives, forecasters may prefer to make
several small revisions rather than a single large revision
(underreaction), which results in positively autocorrelated
revisions. On the other hand, when βˆi < 0, there is evi-
dence of overreaction. The OLS estimator provides a con-
sistent estimate for Eq. (8). However, statistical inference
requires the correlation structure of forecast errors to be
taken into account. Therefore, we use a GMM-type estima-
tor to estimate Var(βˆ), and compute the elements of the
covariance matrix as follows:
Cov(ξi,t1,h1 , ξj,t2,h2)
= Cov(ut1,h1+1 + ηi,t1,h1+1, ut2,h2+1 + ηj,t2,h2+1). (9)
In our analysis, we also consider a pooled approach
by imposing a common β on all forecasters, in order to
determine whether forecasters overreact or underreact
to new information on average. We do not investigate
horizon-specific βs, due to sample size limitations.
Table 5 reports the efficiency test results. When con-
sidering the GDP growth forecasts, the hypothesis of
efficiency can be rejected for eight countries (at a 1% signif-
icance level for six countries and a 10% significance level for
two countries). The estimates of β are positive for all of the
countries, indicating a general tendency to underreact to
new information. However, these values are no larger than
those reported for developed economies in previous stud-
ies (see for example Lahiri & Sheng, 2008). This indicates
that Asia’s volatile macroeconomic environment does not
seem to affect the ability, or willingness, of forecasters to
incorporate new information efficiently. However, at the
individual forecaster level, forecast efficiency can be re-
jected at the 5% level for only a small number of individ-
ual forecasters (35 out of 175). Of these 35 forecasters, 34
show underreaction and just one shows overreaction.
As for the consensus forecast, Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2012) have shown that the correlation of the
revisions can be explained by the infrequent updatingof forecasters’ information sets (i.e., ‘‘sticky information
model’’), as well as by the existence of noisy signals (‘‘noisy
information model’’). However, neither of these models
predicts the finding that individual forecast revisions are
autocorrelated. As long as forecasters place the optimal
weight on new information (see e.g. Lahiri & Sheng, 2008),
individual forecast revisions should be unpredictable. In
otherwords, evidence thatβi > 0 shows that there ismore
stickiness in the forecasts than noisy information models
would predict.
The finding of forecast underreaction can be explained
by behavioral factors. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) ar-
gue that forecasters may not care about accuracy per se,
but instead may seek to mimic the forecasting patterns of
well-informed forecasters, in order to enhance their own
reputations. In this setting, they show that forecasters may
be reluctant to make large forecast revisions because large
revisions signal that the previous forecasts were wrong.
Therefore, forecasters would be expected to adjust fore-
casts insufficiently upon the arrival of new information.
This is termed ‘‘rational stubbornness’’. Deschamps and
Ioannidis (2013) find evidence of rational stubbornness
amongprofessional forecasters for theG-7 countries. In the
same vein, Batchelor andDua (1992) argue that clientsmay
perceive forecasters who change their forecasts frequently
to be erratic. As a result, forecasters may strategically
choose to underreact to new information. Another possi-
ble explanationmay be that forecasts are overly sticky due
to herding behavior. For instance, Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2006) show that it is optimal to bias forecasts towards
the consensus, so as to appear better informed. Because of
herding behaviors, forecasts will be adjusted to new infor-
mation gradually rather than immediately, causing posi-
tive autocorrelation of revisions.
Dovern et al. (2015) also study forecast efficiency for
a larger set of countries, including the Asian countries.
However, they use a different methodology and focus
only on GDP growth, whereas we study both GDP growth
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pronounced for emerging economies than for advanced
economies, which they explain as being due to the
lower quality of economic statistics in emerging countries.
Interestingly, we find the opposite result. In our sample,
five countries may be classified as advanced economies
(Japan, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and
five as developing economies (China, Thailand, Malaysia,
India, and Indonesia). We find that forecast underreaction
for GDP growth is always larger for the five advanced
countries (from a minimum of 0.08 in Hong Kong to a
maximum of 0.16 in Taiwan) than for the five developing
countries (from a minimum of 0.00 for China to a
maximum of 0.08 in Malaysia).
Turning to inflation, forecast efficiency can be rejected
for three countries, namely Japan (underreaction), Korea
(overreaction) and Thailand (underreaction). It is notice-
able that the estimates of β for inflation are smaller than
those for GDP growth. In addition, individual forecast ef-
ficiency can be rejected for only a very small number of
forecasters (12 out of 175), further indicating that new
information is incorporated into inflation forecasts more
promptly than GDP growth forecasts. Compared to pre-
vious analyses for developed countries (see for exam-
ple Dovern & Weisser, 2011), no strong evidence against
the efficiency of inflation forecasts for Asia is found.
6. Assessment of forecast errors
We have argued in Section 3 that the low predictability
and high unconditional variance of growth and inflation
may have contributed to the overall high RMSE of Asian
forecasts. In this section, we discuss the roles of forecast
under-/overreaction and systematic biases in explaining
the high RMSE. In general, forecast under-/overreaction is
expected to have an adverse effect on the forecast accuracy.
The forecast errors tend to be larger than those obtained
when the individual forecasts are not optimal, e.g., when
new information is incorporated overly slowly.
Our results for inflation show that the degree of
forecast over-/underreaction is almost zero, indicating that
there is no evidence that the poor performances of the
forecasts in terms of RMSEs are due to an inefficient use
of information. The degree of underreaction is also low
for GDP growth (maximum of 0.16 for Taiwan and cross-
country average of 0.09), being comparable to that found
in previous studies for the G-7 economies. In other words,
the intensity of forecast underreaction is not particularly
high, and the high RMSEs in Asia cannot be explained by
an inefficient use of information. To investigate this issue
further, we also compute the cross-country correlation
between the RMSE and the estimated β . The correlations
are low and insignificant (0.20 for the GDP growth and
−0.11 for inflation), confirming there is no evidence of a
link between underreaction and forecast accuracy in our
sample.
Systematic biases are also expected to have an adverse
effect on the forecast accuracy. In order to assess the
role played by biases, we filter the estimated biases from
the actual forecasts and calculate bias-adjusted forecasts,
which we denote by f ∗i,t,h = fi,t,h + φˆi,h, where φˆi,h =1
T
T
t=1(At − fi,t,h) is the forecaster- and horizon-specific
bias. We denote the mean of the individual RMSE for the
bias-adjusted forecasts by RMSE∗h ,8 and we expect that
RMSE∗h < RMSEh.
Table 6 reports RMSE∗h values for the selected horizons
h = 1, 12, 24. When comparing the results in Table 6 with
those in Table 1, we find that RMSE∗h < RMSEh. In particu-
lar, for the GDP growth forecasts, RMSE would be 3%–19%
lower if therewas no bias (see Tables 1 and 6). For inflation,
the range is from 3% to 25%. We find that the RMSE dispar-
ities for the bias-adjusted forecasts are as large as those for
the unadjusted forecasts, which shows that biases do not
seem to play a major role in explaining why some coun-
tries have such large RMSEs. For instance, the GDP growth
forecasts for China are much more accurate than those for
Thailand, and this would still be the case even after adjust-
ing for biases. Furthermore, the RMSEs of the bias-adjusted
forecasts are still well above the unadjusted RMSEs found
in other studies for non-Asian advanced economies (see
e.g. Dovern & Weisser, 2011), further indicating that bi-
ases cannot explain much of the poor RMSE performances
of Asian forecasts.
Overall, we argue that biases and forecast underreac-
tion do not seem to explain much of the poor forecast per-
formance in Asia. The performances of the forecasts would
remain poor and the RMSE disparities would persist even
in the absence of systematic biases and underreaction.
7. Directional accuracy
Some studies have pointed out that being able to fore-
cast the direction of the change accurately is particu-
larly important for investors and policymakers (Altavilla &
De Grauwe, 2010; Bergmeir, Costantini, & Benítez, 2014;
Blaskowitz & Herwartz, 2009, 2011, 2014). For investors,
an investment decision that is driven by a specific macroe-
conomic forecast with a small forecast error may not nec-
essarily be as profitable as an investment decision that is
guided by an accurate prediction of the direction of change.
For policymakers, directional predictions are crucial for ad-
justing policy instruments, such as increasing or decreas-
ing interest rates (Öller & Barot, 2000).
In this section, we analyse the directional accuracy of
the professional forecasts in Asia. To this end, we use the
following measure (see Blaskowitz & Herwartz, 2009):
LDAi,t,h = I((fi,t,h − At−1)(At − At−1) > 0)
− I((fi,t,h − At−1)(At − At−1) < 0), (10)
where I(·) is an indicator function and LDAi,t,h takes the value
1 (−1) if the direction of change is predicted correctly (in-
correctly). We calculate the average of LDAi,t,h among the
forecasters as LDAh = 1NT
N
i=1
T
t=1 L
DA
i,t,h, for selected hori-
zons h = 1, 4, 8, 12. Table 7 reports the results. A positive
value of LDAh indicates that the forecasts outperform a ran-
dom toss of a coin. The values are largely positive for both
8 More specifically, RMSE∗i,h =

T−1
T
t=1(ei,t,h − φˆi,h)2 and RMSE∗h
= 1N
N
i=1 RMSE
∗
i,h.
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Bias-adjusted RMSE, averaged across forecasters.
China Japan Taiwan Hong Kong Korea Singapore India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
GDP
h = 1 0.33 0.42 0.61 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.65 0.51 0.38 0.82
h = 12 0.98 1.80 2.32 2.92 2.30 3.34 1.61 2.35 3.05 3.12
h = 24 1.47 2.30 2.85 3.85 3.54 4.08 1.71 3.28 3.50 4.02
Inflation
h = 1 0.34 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.80 0.65 0.19 0.23
h = 12 2.20 0.49 0.91 1.37 1.08 1.37 2.24 7.39 1.08 0.99
h = 24 3.71 0.62 1.23 2.47 1.47 1.65 2.21 8.73 1.51 1.58
Notes: The table reports RMSE∗h (see Section 6) for selected horizons.Table 7
Directional accuracy.
China Japan Taiwan Hong Kong Korea Singapore India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
GDP
All obs.
h = 1 0.88 0.74 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.76 0.92 0.92 0.92
h = 4 0.64 0.48 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.64 0.82 0.70 0.78
h = 8 0.34 0.44 0.60 0.86 0.84 0.78 0.50 0.68 0.56 0.60
h = 12 0.16 0.46 0.56 0.88 0.72 0.64 0.30 0.52 0.58 0.44
∆At > 0
h = 1 0.72 0.72 0.94 0.98 0.86 0.92 0.66 0.86 0.86 0.80
h = 4 0.32 0.48 0.60 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.52 0.72 0.44 0.64
h = 8 −0.18 0.48 0.46 0.82 0.66 0.54 0.42 0.54 0.20 0.62
h = 12 −0.42 0.32 0.50 0.92 0.50 0.30 0.22 0.32 0.22 0.56
∆At < 0
h = 1 0.98 0.74 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.98 1.00 1.00
h = 4 0.88 0.50 0.84 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.78 0.96 1.00 0.88
h = 8 0.76 0.40 0.74 0.88 0.94 0.96 0.58 0.84 0.98 0.56
h = 12 0.62 0.58 0.62 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.36 0.78 1.00 0.34
Inflation
All obs.
h = 1 0.90 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.40 0.94 0.92 0.84
h = 4 0.88 0.90 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.44 0.86 0.78 0.72
h = 8 0.78 0.64 0.42 0.76 0.70 0.58 0.06 0.74 0.56 0.72
h = 12 0.54 0.42 0.22 0.62 0.62 0.44 −0.14 0.62 0.38 0.50
∆At > 0
h = 1 0.82 0.96 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.38 0.92 0.98 0.88
h = 4 0.86 0.96 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.92 0.50 0.88 1.00 0.80
h = 8 0.96 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.68 0.80 0.10 0.66 0.92 0.60
h = 12 0.76 0.58 0.72 0.74 0.62 0.74 −0.22 0.46 0.72 0.34
∆At < 0
h = 1 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.94 0.86 0.76
h = 4 0.90 0.86 0.66 0.70 0.88 0.88 0.34 0.86 0.56 0.54
h = 8 0.62 0.52 0.10 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.00 0.80 0.26 0.94
h = 12 0.34 0.24 −0.16 0.42 0.64 0.64 −0.04 0.80 0.02 0.86
AR(1)
GDP
all obs. 0.29 0.29 0.53 0.06 0.29 0.53 0.06 0.06 0.18 −0.06
∆At > 0 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.71 0.00 0.11 0.11 −0.43
∆At < 0 0.33 0.11 0.56 −0.11 −0.17 0.40 0.11 0.00 0.25 0.20
Inflation
all obs. 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.41 −0.18 0.18 −0.18 0.41 0.06
∆At > 0 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.27
∆At < 0 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.71 −0.43 0.25 −0.33 0.71 0.33
Notes: The values indicate the directional accuracy loss, given by Eq. (10).growth and inflation, indicating that the professional fore-
casts have positive value for predicting directions.
To evaluate the performances of the panelists in
terms of directional accuracy further, we also consider
an AR(1) model as a benchmark model. The AR(1) model
is estimated using actual values, and its out-of-sample
forecasting performance is given in Table 7.9 The
9 The AR forecast is denoted AˆARt = θˆ0 + θˆ1At−1.professional forecasts beat the AR(1) in predicting the
direction of change for almost all of the countries, regard-
less of the horizon. The directional accuracy is remark-
ably high in some cases (see the forecasts of GDP growth
for Hong Kong), although we do observe large disparities
across countries. Unsurprisingly, the directional accuracy
improves vastly when moving to shorter horizons, as the
information underlying the forecasts becomes increasingly
accurate.
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equally good at predicting positive and negative changes.
For the forecasts of GDP growth, DA is typically higher
when the change is negative (∆At = At − At−1 < 0),
which implies that panelists predict slowdowns better
than accelerations. A close look at the data reveals that
almost all forecasters predict the sign of change correctly
for most of the years. However, for each country there
are one or two years where DA is very low, even at short
horizons.
When averaging across horizons, for instance, the loss
function is−0.64 forMalaysia in 2007,−0.06 for Singapore
in 1997, −0.68 for Taiwan in 2007, and −0.90 for China
in 2005. It turns out that these very low values of DA are
observed during years of positive change, which explains
why DA is lower for accelerations. In each of these cases,
the low DA value for that year was preceded by another
acceleration, with forecasters usually failing to predict the
second acceleration. For instance, GDP growth accelerated
in China in 2003 and 2004, and panelists were surprised to
the very end by the further acceleration in 2005. The same
phenomenon occurred in Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Korea. In other words, forecasters seem to be relatively
poor at forecasting changeswhen the economy accelerates
for two consecutive years.
Turning to inflation, the results aremoremixed, andwe
find that positive changes are predicted correctly more of-
ten than negative changes for several countries. This find-
ing also reflects the fact that Asia has made great progress
in fighting against inflation (see Filardo & Genberg, 2010),
and forecasters have regularly failed to anticipate inflation
slowdowns, resulting in a relatively low DA for negative
changes. Interestingly, the countries that have adopted ex-
plicit inflation targeting (Indonesia in 2000, Korea in 1999,
and Thailand in 2000) have been more successful at pre-
dicting negative changes. A possible explanation for this
may be that the downward trend in inflation was pre-
dictable due to the government commitment to stick to
low inflation for these three countries.
It is worth noting that a country that performs well in
terms of DA will not necessarily perform well in terms of
RMSE, and vice versa. For example, China ranks first in
terms of RMSE for GDP growth, but shows the worst result
for DA, whereas Indonesia does the opposite for inflation.
For some other countries, the forecast performances are
equally good/bad in terms of the two accuracy measures.
This suggests that the two accuracy measures are distinct,
and both should be considered when assessing the overall
forecast performance.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive as-
sessment of the performances of GDP growth and inflation
forecasts for a set of ten Asian economies over the period
1995–2012. We have evaluated the accuracy of the fore-
casts using both RMSE and a directional forecast accuracy
measure, and tested for unbiasedness and efficiency. The
results are as follows. First, the forecast errors are large formost of the countries; nevertheless, the forecasts are still
directionally accurate. Large disparities in the magnitudes
of the forecast errors (and long-term predictability) are
also observed across countries, for both GDP growth and
inflation. For most of the countries, the forecast accuracy
is higher for inflation than for growth, which underscores
the fact that inflation is intrinsically easier to predict.
Further, the forecast accuracy in Asia improves relatively
slowly as we move from long to short horizons. This re-
sult may also help to explain the high RMSEs. Second, the
unbiasedness hypothesis cannot be rejected for the major-
ity of countries. However, the inflation forecasts show a
tendency to overpredict, which may be due to the decline
of inflation in Asia. Finally, the hypothesis that forecasters
incorporate new information efficiently is rejected widely
for the forecasts of GDP growth, indicating a tendency to
underreact, whereas we find little evidence of information
stickiness for inflation.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the rel-
ative forecasting performances of advanced and emerging
economies. Our results show that there is no correlation
between forecast accuracy (and predictability) and the de-
gree of economic development. However, surprisingly and
unlike previous studies, we find that the underreaction for
forecasts of GDP growth is more pronounced for advanced
economies. Overall, we find little evidence that forecast-
ers perform better in advanced economies (Singapore or
Korea) than in emerging countries (China or India). Future
research exploring the channels through which economic
development affects forecast performances would be very
beneficial.
Appendix. Initial versus revised figures
Throughout the paper, we have evaluated forecasts us-
ing the initial estimates of GDP growth and inflation rather
than the revised figures. It is possible that some forecast-
ers may target revised figures rather than the initial an-
nouncement, and it is important to verify that our main
results are robust to the use of revised figures. Startingwith
inflation, the revised and initial IMF figures are actually ex-
tremely similar. Themean absolute difference between ini-
tial and revised inflation estimates is less than 0.1%, with
the exception of Indonesia (0.3%). None of our main re-
sults would be affected if we used revised figures. For GDP,
however, the situation is slightly different. In China and
Singapore, we observe average upward GDP estimate re-
visions of 0.7% and 0.5% respectively. The mean absolute
difference between initial and revised figures is consider-
ably larger than for inflation, ranging from0.2% for Korea to
1.2% for Singapore. Using revised figures as the benchmark,
the estimated RMSEs are generally unaffected, except for
China, where the RMSEs would almost double. In general,
the RMSEs are smallerwhen using the initial figures, which
is consistent with the view that panelists target initial es-
timates. In terms of GDP unbiasedness and efficiency tests,
the statistical significance of the estimates would not be
affected.
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